
Marissa Stevens received a
Runner-Up Award in the University
Undergraduate Division of the essay
contest. She is a 21-year-old senior
from Washington and Jefferson
College in Washington, Pennsylvania,
and is pursuing a double major in
history and sociology with a minor
in philosophy. Marissa is active in
many clubs on campus, including the
W&J Wind Ensemble, Dance Team, Asian
Cultural Association, and the
History Club. After graduating from
W&J in 2010, Marissa wishes to
continue her education and obtain a
Ph.D. in archaeology. This summer
she studied hieroglyphics in Egypt
at the American University in Cairo.
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Russian Influence on Prussia During and
After the Seven Years War
Otto von Bismarck was once asked,
“What is the secret of politics?” He replied, “The secret of
politics? Make a good treaty with Russia.”
While a joking answer in nature, Bismarck makes a fair point:
the power of Russia as an ally can indeed sway political and
military might in one’s favor. As is the case of the Seven
Years War, Prussia would have been defeated if it were not for
an immediate switch in Russia’s ruler, and consequentially,
Russia’s political opinion. What led to this seemingly
spontaneous switch in Russian military and political strategy,
and did this switch cause Prussia to emerge from the Seven Years
War a victor? The collapse of the Austro-Russian alliance and
the subsequent change in Russian strategy reshaped the probable
outcome of the Seven Years War in favor of Prussia, and
established Russia as a dominant power in Europe.

Lindsay Hoff receiving the award for Marissa
Stevens,
UU Division Runner-Up
Russia’s ill-fated
alliance with Austria stemmed from fear of Prussian dominance at
the culmination of the Silesian Wars, where Austria lost its
richest providence of Silesia to Prussia. The Austrian monarch,
Maria Theresa was so outraged by the loss of this precious land
to Frederick the Great that she refused to sign the Peace of
Aix-la-Chapelle and began to mobilize an anti-Prussian
coalition.
“Russia could already be counted on: alarmed at Prussia’s
unexpected military success, Tsaritsa Elizabeth…came to see
Brandenburg-Prussia as a rival for influence in the eastern
Baltic and a potential block to Russian westward expansion.”
Thus, Austria and Russia began
plotting against Prussia, with the ultimate goal of partitioning
Prussia and Hohenzollern territory between the two ultimately
victorious empires.
What followed this initial Austro-Russian
alliance can only be described as a chaotic struggle throughout
Europe to forge alliances in order to protect one’s borders and
negate any power that another country might possess. So
transfixed was Maria Theresa with the reacquisition of her
stolen Silesia that she abandoned her long-time ally Great
Britain for France. This new tactic overlooked traditional
Austrian alliances and focused more on national interests and
the advancement of the Austrian Empire. Frederick the Great,
who was originally allied with France, entered negotiations with
Great Britain. He eventually entertained an agreement at the
Convention of Westminster in 1756, when he heard that King
George II proposed to finance Russian troops to fight against
Prussia. Tsaritsa Elizabeth of Russia was outraged to learn
that Great Britain’s finances were denied her country by
Prussia’s political prowess, particularly because terms that
promised the funding of Russian troops had already been agreed
upon by Great Britain in the Convention of St. Petersburg in
1755.
These newly formed
alliances proved seemingly fatal to Prussia. Frederick the
Great left, in the wake of his negotiations, three enraged
countries: Austria, Russia, and France. Together, with Sweden
and several German States, they formed a strong anti-Prussian
coalition and contracted a Second Treaty of Versailles, where
each country of the coalition pledged troops and finances toward
the goal of crushing the Prussian Empire.
What started as an Austrian negotiation with Russia for support
in regaining Silesia had grown into a multinational force with
the ultimate goal of the complete destruction of Prussia.
The fact that Prussia
triumphed over all its enemies is not only shocking, but is also
extremely overstated. Yes, it can be stated that Prussia
emerged the victor simply because it did not fall to the
anti-Prussian coalition. However, it is more accurate to state
that Prussia simply fought long enough to wait out the waning
power of the enemy. Therefore, it is far more accurate to say
that the anti-Prussian coalition failed, rather than stating
that Prussia succeeded. The breakdown of the coalition was
eminent.
France was the first to detach
itself from the coalition; it had far more pressing matters with
England and the power struggle over colonization in the New
World. Just as Austria and Russia had feared the growing power
of Prussia when Silesia had been conquered, Austria and Russia
now feared each other. Neither country wanted to fully commit
to the coalition out of concern that it would provide the other
with a power advantage.
The final breath of the coalition was taken with the dying
breath of Tsaritsa Elisabeth in 1762.
From that point, the opinion of
one man, Grand Duke Peter, fatefully determined the outcome of
the Seven Years War.
Saying that Grand Duke Peter,
crowned Tsar Peter III, was a sympathizer of Frederick the Great
and the Prussian cause would be an understatement. Peter's first
official action as Tsar ended all hostilities against Prussia,
and signed a treaty with Frederick the Great on April 24, 1762.
The treaty stated that all territories currently under Russian
occupation (which extended to and included Berlin) would be
restored to Prussia. This was a huge blow to the Russian army,
who had suffered great losses in an attempt to conquer Prussia.
He further alienated his military by utilizing Prussian military
training tactics during his reign and even equipping his
soldiers and officers with Prussian-style uniforms. Tsar Peter
III sent a personal letter to Frederick the Great, assuring him
of his devotion and friendship, and even wore a ring with a
portrait of his idol, none other than Frederick the Great.
Even though Catherine the Great
quickly displaced Tsar Peter III from the Russian throne, the
damage was done. There was no reviving the Austrian alliance,
and the anti-Prussian coalition ceased to exist. Austria, the
most bitter rival of Prussia, was forced to give up the cause of
regaining Silesia and seeing Prussia crushed. After seven years
of fighting, Austria was out of resources, money, and soldiers.
As mentioned earlier, it is hard to appoint a victor, because
the agreement at the end of the war returned everything to the
status quo ante bellum.
However, one power not to be
overlooked is Russia. Although Russia abandoned the coalition
and did not gain any territory, its reputation emerged from the
carnage of war as a powerhouse in Europe.
From the end of the Seven Years
War onward, “Russian interventions determined or helped to
determine power-political outcomes in Germany. From this moment
onwards, the history of Prussia and the history of Russia would
remain intertwined.”
For the rest of Frederick the
Great’s reign, he relied on an alliance with Russia that was
established on April 11, 1764, and renewed on October 12, 1769.
This alliance connected both Prussia and Russia to the question
over the future of Poland.
Russia wanted to gain possession of much of Poland, primarily as
a means of extending influence into the rest of Europe.
Russia had used Poland
during the Seven Years War as a base for troop operations, and
Russian presence in Poland remained prominent after the war’s
end.
On a more noble note, Tsarina
Catherine the Great wanted to liberate the millions of Orthodox
Christians residing within Polish borders, as they were denied
political and civil rights.
Prussia saw an
opportunity with the questionable fate of Poland. Frederick the
Great knew that he had to sustain friendly relations with Russia
or face certain political isolation. He had made too many
enemies during the Seven Years War and needed Russia to remain
an ally. Furthermore, he desperately needed to make sure that
Russia and Austria avoid the creation of a second alliance,
which forced his amenable relationship with Russia to be even
more important for the well-being of Prussia. Frederick the
Great needed Russia’s support more than ever in the wake of the
Seven Years War.
“But here too memories
of the war interfered. Empress Catherine had risen to power by
opposing her husband’s Prussian alliance; in the first manifesto
after her accession she declared the King of Prussia to be the
‘mortal enemy’ of Russia.”
However, the aid that Prussia
could provide in the acquisition of Polish territory proved too
tempting to resist; an alliance was formed.
This Prusso-Russian alliance
served Prussian interests more than those of Russia, but the
concern over Poland unified both nations.
While Catherine the Great was
attempting to gain Polish territory by force, Frederick the
Great offered to split Poland between the two of them by means
of a treaty, eliminating the amount of resistance that would be
encountered. At first, this proposition was not well received
by the Tsarina.
“But then Austria occupied the formerly Hungarian county
of Szepes and other adjacent Polish districts as pawns in a
reparations quarrel with Poland. This turn of events caused the
Tsarina…to mention the possibility of Russia and Prussia also
helping themselves to a piece of Poland.”
The Polish question
quickly solidified the alliance between Prussia and Russia
became the basis for understanding and friendly negotiations
between Austria and the newly formed Prusso- Russian alliance.
In the First Partition of Poland of 1772, Russia gained the
largest portion, proving its dominance among the European
nations and asserting its power in political matters.
Russian Poland became an outlet
for Russia to project its influence into Central Europe and to
showcase its strength to the countries throughout Europe.
Otto von Bismarck was certainly correct in
saying that an alliance with Russia can make all the difference
when it comes to politics. If it was not for Russia’s timely
switch in alliances, the outcome of the Seven Years War would
have been unrecognizably different. The Prussian Empire, in all
probability, would have been lost to the anti-Prussian coalition
of Austria, Russia, and France. Austria would have claimed
dominance in Central Europe. The Habsburgs would have regained
their precious Silesia and so much more. Instead, the
culmination of seven year’s worth of fighting is a bit
anti-climatic: a Central Europe fully restored to its state
before the war began. However unexciting the war’s end may be,
Russia still gained much in status, prestige, and power.
Hohenzollern-Habsburg rivalry provided Russia with the chance to
assert itself as Europe’s most powerful and aggressive state.
The resulting power that Russia had over Central Europe during
and after the Seven Years War cannot be denied: Russia is a
force that one would always want as an ally.
Bibliography
Clark, Christopher, Iron
Kingdom, The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2006).
Hintze, Otto, “Masterly Diplomacy:
A Beneficial New Order,” Frederick the Great and the Making
of Prussia (New York: Pobert E. Krieger Publishing Company,
1976) 40-44.
Ritter, Gerhart, “Rational Power
Politics,” Frederick the Great and the Making of Prussia
(New York: Pobert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1976) 45-52.
ThinkExist.com, “Russia Quotes,”
http://thinkexist.com/quotes/with/keyword/russia/ (accessed
October 2, 2007).
Ursula’s History Web, “The Death of
the Empress and the Reign of Peter III,”
http://members.tripod.com/~Nevermore/Cgreat5.htm
(accessed October 2, 2007).
ThinkExist.com,
“Russia Quotes,” http://thinkexist.com/quotes/with/keyword/russia/
(accessed October 2, 2007).
Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom, The Rise and
Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (Cambridge: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006)
196-197.
Ursula’s History Web, “The Death of the Empress and the
Reign of Peter III,”
http://members.tripod.com/~Nevermore/Cgreat5.htm
(accessed October 2, 2007).
Otto
Hintze, “Masterly Diplomacy: A Beneficial New Order,”
Frederick the Great and the Making of Prussia (New
York: Pobert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1976) 40.
Gerhart Ritter, “Rational Power Politics,” Frederick
the Great and the Making of Prussia (New York:
Pobert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1976) 47.
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