Marissa Stevens

Marissa Stevens received a Runner-Up Award in the University Undergraduate Division of the essay contest. She is a 21-year-old senior from Washington and Jefferson College in Washington, Pennsylvania, and is pursuing a double major in history and sociology with a minor in philosophy. Marissa is active in many clubs on campus, including the W&J Wind Ensemble, Dance Team, Asian Cultural Association, and the History Club.  After graduating from W&J in 2010, Marissa wishes to continue her education and obtain a Ph.D. in archaeology. This summer she studied hieroglyphics in Egypt at the American University in Cairo.

Russian Influence on Prussia During and After the Seven Years War

            Otto von Bismarck was once asked, “What is the secret of politics?” He replied, “The secret of politics? Make a good treaty with Russia.”[1]  While a joking answer in nature, Bismarck makes a fair point: the power of Russia as an ally can indeed sway political and military might in one’s favor.  As is the case of the Seven Years War, Prussia would have been defeated if it were not for an immediate switch in Russia’s ruler, and consequentially, Russia’s political opinion.  What led to this seemingly spontaneous switch in Russian military and political strategy, and did this switch cause Prussia to emerge from the Seven Years War a victor?  The collapse of the Austro-Russian alliance and the subsequent change in Russian strategy reshaped the probable outcome of the Seven Years War in favor of Prussia, and established Russia as a dominant power in Europe.


Lindsay Hoff receiving the award for Marissa Stevens,
UU Division Runner-Up

            Russia’s ill-fated alliance with Austria stemmed from fear of Prussian dominance at the culmination of the Silesian Wars, where Austria lost its richest providence of Silesia to Prussia.  The Austrian monarch, Maria Theresa was so outraged by the loss of this precious land to Frederick the Great that she refused to sign the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and began to mobilize an anti-Prussian coalition.[2]  “Russia could already be counted on: alarmed at Prussia’s unexpected military success, Tsaritsa Elizabeth…came to see Brandenburg-Prussia as a rival for influence in the eastern Baltic and a potential block to Russian westward expansion.”[3]  Thus, Austria and Russia began plotting against Prussia, with the ultimate goal of partitioning Prussia and Hohenzollern territory between the two ultimately victorious empires.[4]

            What followed this initial Austro-Russian alliance can only be described as a chaotic struggle throughout Europe to forge alliances in order to protect one’s borders and negate any power that another country might possess.  So transfixed was Maria Theresa with the reacquisition of her stolen Silesia that she abandoned her long-time ally Great Britain for France.  This new tactic overlooked traditional Austrian alliances and focused more on national interests and the advancement of the Austrian Empire.   Frederick the Great, who was originally allied with France, entered negotiations with Great Britain.  He eventually entertained an agreement at the Convention of Westminster in 1756, when he heard that King George II proposed to finance Russian troops to fight against Prussia.  Tsaritsa Elizabeth of Russia was outraged to learn that Great Britain’s finances were denied her country by Prussia’s political prowess, particularly because terms that promised the funding of Russian troops had already been agreed upon by Great Britain in the Convention of St. Petersburg in 1755.[5]

            These newly formed alliances proved seemingly fatal to Prussia.  Frederick the Great left, in the wake of his negotiations, three enraged countries: Austria, Russia, and France.  Together, with Sweden and several German States, they formed a strong anti-Prussian coalition and contracted a Second Treaty of Versailles, where each country of the coalition pledged troops and finances toward the goal of crushing the Prussian Empire.[6]  What started as an Austrian negotiation with Russia for support in regaining Silesia had grown into a multinational force with the ultimate goal of the complete destruction of Prussia.

            The fact that Prussia triumphed over all its enemies is not only shocking, but is also extremely overstated.  Yes, it can be stated that Prussia emerged the victor simply because it did not fall to the anti-Prussian coalition.  However, it is more accurate to state that Prussia simply fought long enough to wait out the waning power of the enemy.  Therefore, it is far more accurate to say that the anti-Prussian coalition failed, rather than stating that Prussia succeeded.  The breakdown of the coalition was eminent. 

France was the first to detach itself from the coalition; it had far more pressing matters with England and the power struggle over colonization in the New World.  Just as Austria and Russia had feared the growing power of Prussia when Silesia had been conquered, Austria and Russia now feared each other.  Neither country wanted to fully commit to the coalition out of concern that it would provide the other with a power advantage.[7]  The final breath of the coalition was taken with the dying breath of Tsaritsa Elisabeth in 1762.[8]  From that point, the opinion of one man, Grand Duke Peter, fatefully determined the outcome of the Seven Years War.

Saying that Grand Duke Peter, crowned Tsar Peter III, was a sympathizer of Frederick the Great and the Prussian cause would be an understatement. Peter's first official action as Tsar ended all hostilities against Prussia, and signed a treaty with Frederick the Great on April 24, 1762.  The treaty stated that all territories currently under Russian occupation (which extended to and included Berlin) would be restored to Prussia.  This was a huge blow to the Russian army, who had suffered great losses in an attempt to conquer Prussia.  He further alienated his military by utilizing Prussian military training tactics during his reign and even equipping his soldiers and officers with Prussian-style uniforms.  Tsar Peter III sent a personal letter to Frederick the Great, assuring him of his devotion and friendship, and even wore a ring with a portrait of his idol, none other than Frederick the Great.[9]  Even though Catherine the Great quickly displaced Tsar Peter III from the Russian throne, the damage was done.  There was no reviving the Austrian alliance, and the anti-Prussian coalition ceased to exist.  Austria, the most bitter rival of Prussia, was forced to give up the cause of regaining Silesia and seeing Prussia crushed.  After seven years of fighting, Austria was out of resources, money, and soldiers.  As mentioned earlier, it is hard to appoint a victor, because the agreement at the end of the war returned everything to the status quo ante bellum.[10]

However, one power not to be overlooked is Russia.  Although Russia abandoned the coalition and did not gain any territory, its reputation emerged from the carnage of war as a powerhouse in Europe.[11]  From the end of the Seven Years War onward, “Russian interventions determined or helped to determine power-political outcomes in Germany.  From this moment onwards, the history of Prussia and the history of Russia would remain intertwined.”[12]  For the rest of Frederick the Great’s reign, he relied on an alliance with Russia that was established on April 11, 1764, and renewed on October 12, 1769. This alliance connected both Prussia and Russia to the question over the future of Poland.[13] Russia wanted to gain possession of much of Poland, primarily as a means of extending influence into the rest of Europe.[14]  Russia had used Poland during the Seven Years War as a base for troop operations, and Russian presence in Poland remained prominent after the war’s end.[15]  On a more noble note, Tsarina Catherine the Great wanted to liberate the millions of Orthodox Christians residing within Polish borders, as they were denied political and civil rights.[16]  Prussia saw an opportunity with the questionable fate of Poland.  Frederick the Great knew that he had to sustain friendly relations with Russia or face certain political isolation.  He had made too many enemies during the Seven Years War and needed Russia to remain an ally.  Furthermore, he desperately needed to make sure that Russia and Austria avoid the creation of a second alliance, which forced his amenable relationship with Russia to be even more important for the well-being of Prussia.  Frederick the Great needed Russia’s support more than ever in the wake of the Seven Years War.[17]  “But here too memories of the war interfered.  Empress Catherine had risen to power by opposing her husband’s Prussian alliance; in the first manifesto after her accession she declared the King of Prussia to be the ‘mortal enemy’ of Russia.”[18]  However, the aid that Prussia could provide in the acquisition of Polish territory proved too tempting to resist; an alliance was formed. 

This Prusso-Russian alliance served Prussian interests more than those of Russia, but the concern over Poland unified both nations.[19]  While Catherine the Great was attempting to gain Polish territory by force, Frederick the Great offered to split Poland between the two of them by means of a treaty, eliminating the amount of resistance that would be encountered.  At first, this proposition was not well received by the Tsarina.[20]  “But then Austria occupied the formerly Hungarian county of Szepes and other adjacent Polish districts as pawns in a reparations quarrel with Poland.  This turn of events caused the Tsarina…to mention the possibility of Russia and Prussia also helping themselves to a piece of Poland.”[21]  The Polish question quickly solidified the alliance between Prussia and Russia became the basis for understanding and friendly negotiations between Austria and the newly formed Prusso- Russian alliance.[22]  In the First Partition of Poland of 1772, Russia gained the largest portion, proving its dominance among the European nations and asserting its power in political matters.[23]  Russian Poland became an outlet for Russia to project its influence into Central Europe and to showcase its strength to the countries throughout Europe.[24]

            Otto von Bismarck was certainly correct in saying that an alliance with Russia can make all the difference when it comes to politics.  If it was not for Russia’s timely switch in alliances, the outcome of the Seven Years War would have been unrecognizably different.  The Prussian Empire, in all probability, would have been lost to the anti-Prussian coalition of Austria, Russia, and France.  Austria would have claimed dominance in Central Europe.  The Habsburgs would have regained their precious Silesia and so much more.  Instead, the culmination of seven year’s worth of fighting is a bit anti-climatic: a Central Europe fully restored to its state before the war began.  However unexciting the war’s end may be, Russia still gained much in status, prestige, and power. Hohenzollern-Habsburg rivalry provided Russia with the chance to assert itself as Europe’s most powerful and aggressive state.  The resulting power that Russia had over Central Europe during and after the Seven Years War cannot be denied: Russia is a force that one would always want as an ally.

Bibliography

Clark, Christopher, Iron Kingdom, The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006).

Hintze, Otto, “Masterly Diplomacy: A Beneficial New Order,” Frederick the Great and the Making of Prussia (New York: Pobert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1976) 40-44.

Ritter, Gerhart, “Rational Power Politics,” Frederick the Great and the Making of Prussia (New York: Pobert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1976) 45-52.

ThinkExist.com,  “Russia Quotes,” http://thinkexist.com/quotes/with/keyword/russia/  (accessed October 2, 2007).

Ursula’s History Web, “The Death of the Empress and the Reign of Peter III,” http://members.tripod.com/~Nevermore/Cgreat5.htm  (accessed October 2, 2007).

[1]ThinkExist.com,  “Russia Quotes,” http://thinkexist.com/quotes/with/keyword/russia/ (accessed October 2, 2007).

[2] Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom, The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006) 196-197.

[3] Ibid., 197.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., 197-198.

[6] Ibid., 200.

[7] Ibid., 201.

[8] Ibid., 205.

[9] Ursula’s History Web, “The Death of the Empress and the Reign of Peter III,” http://members.tripod.com/~Nevermore/Cgreat5.htm  (accessed October 2, 2007).

[10] Clark, op. cit., 204-206.

[11] Ibid., 211.

[12] Ibid., 212.

[13] Otto Hintze, “Masterly Diplomacy: A Beneficial New Order,” Frederick the Great and the Making of Prussia (New York: Pobert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1976) 40.

[14] Ibid., 40-42.

[15] Gerhart Ritter, “Rational Power Politics,” Frederick the Great and the Making of Prussia (New York: Pobert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1976) 47.

[16] Hintze, op. cit., 41.

[17] Ibid., 47.

[18] Ibid., 46.

[19] Ibid., 46-47.

[20] Ibid., 42.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Clark, op. cit., 232.

[24] Ibid., 231.

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